SUPREME COURT UPDATES

Everything demanded by in-laws will be considered as dowry, law meant to curb social evil of dowry: Supreme Court

The Supreme Court has also ruled the demand for money for the construction of the house as dowry.

“The word dowry should be described as a broad era to incorporate any demand from a woman, whether in connection with the property or anything valuable.”

Interpretation of a provision of law that will defeat the very intention of the legislature must be shunned in favour of an interpretation that will promote the object sought to be achieved through the legislation meant to uproot a social evil like dowry demand.

In this context the word “Dowry” ought to be ascribed an expansive meaning so as to encompass any demand made on a woman, whether in respect of a property or a valuable security of any nature.

When dealing with cases under Section 304-B IPC, a provision legislated to act as a deterrent in the society and curb the heinous crime of dowry demands, the shift in the approach of the courts ought to be from strict to liberal, from constricted to dilated. Any rigid meaning would tend to bring to naught, the real object of the provision. Therefore, a push in the right direction is required to accomplish the task of eradicating this evil which has become deeply entrenched in our society.

In less than four years of her marriage, victim committed suicide at her matrimonial home by pouring kerosene oil and setting herself on fire. She was admitted in a burnt condition in the Community Health Centre, Baroda and breathed her last on the same day. At that time, she was five months pregnant. On receiving information from the attending doctor, an FIR was lodged. On completion of the investigation, the chargesheet was filed and the case was committed for trial in the Sessions Court.

It was found that the accused was demanding money from the dying woman to build a house, which her family members were unable to pay. A provision to act as a deterrent in society and to prevent heinous crimes of dowry demand, changes in the attitude of courts should be the most moderate. The woman was constantly harassed about it, which made her commit suicide. On an appeal filed against the verdict, the MP High Court said, the demand for money for the construction of the house cannot be treated as a dowry demand.

Rejecting the mother-in-law’s appeal in another dowry harassment case, the Supreme Court said,

“When only one woman does not save another woman, it is a serious crime. The court convicted the mother-in-law and sentenced her to three months in jail. The court said it is a very frightening situation when a woman is so cruel to her own daughter-in-law that she takes a step of suicide.

In the above context, the Hon’ble court usefully refer to a recent decision of a three Judge Bench of this Court in Gurmeet Singh v. State of Punjab(2021) 6 SCC 108 that has restated the detailed guidelines that have been laid down in Satbir Singh and Another v. State of Haryana (2021) 6 SCC 1, both authored by Chief Justice N.V. Ramana, relating to trial under Section 304-B IPC where the law on Section 304-B IPC and Section 113-B of the Evidence Act has been pithily summarized in the following words:

“38.1. Section 304-B IPC must be interpreted keeping in mind the legislative intent to curb the social evil of bride burning and dowry demand.

38.2. The prosecution must at first establish the existence of the necessary ingredients for constituting an offence under Section 304-B IPC. Once these ingredients are satisfied, the rebuttable presumption of causality, provided under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act operates against the accused.

38.3. The phrase “soon before” as appearing in Section 304-B IPC cannot be construed to mean “immediately before”. The prosecution must establish existence of “proximate and live link” between the dowry death and cruelty or harassment for dowry demand by the husband or his relatives.

38.4. Section 304-B IPC does not take a pigeonhole approach in categorising death as homicidal or suicidal or accidental. The reason for such non-categorisation is due to the fact that death occurring “otherwise than under normal circumstances” can, in cases, be homicidal or suicidal or accidental.”

In the light of the above provision that defines the word “dowry” and takes in its ambit any kind of property or valuable security, in our opinion, the High Court fell into an error by holding that the demand of money for construction of a house cannot be treated as a dowry demand.

Dowry death law: The most fundamental constituent for attracting the provisions of Section 304-B IPC is that the death of the woman must be a dowry death. The ingredients for making out an offence under Section 304-B have been reiterated in several rulings of this Court. Four pre-requisites for convicting an accused for the offence punishable under Section 304- B are as follows:

(i) that the death of a woman must have been caused by burns or bodily injury or occurred otherwise than under normal circumstance;

(ii) that such a death must have occurred within a period of seven years of her marriage;

(iii) that the woman must have been subjected to cruelty or harassment at the hands of her husband, soon
before her death; and

(iv) that such a cruelty or harassment must have been
for or related to any demand for dowry.

As the word “dowry” has been defined in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, the said provision gains significance and is extracted below:

2. Definition of ‘dowry’ –

In this Act, “dowry” means any property or valuable security given or agreed to be given either directly or indirectly –

(a) by one party to a marriage to the other party to the marriage; or

(b) by the parents of either party to a marriage by any other person, to either party to the marriage or to any other person;

The trial court had convicted the husband and father-in-law of the deceased in the case under Section 304-B (dowry murder), inciting self-pleasure and dowry harassment of IPC.

In a three Judge Bench decision of this Court in Rajinder Singh v. State of Punjab 9, Section 2 of the Dowry Act has been split into six distinct parts for a better understanding of the said provision, which are as follows:

“8. A perusal of Section 2 shows that this definition can be broken into six distinct parts:

(1) Dowry must first consist of any property or valuable security— the word “any” is a word of width and would, therefore, include within it property and valuable security of any kind whatsoever.

(2) Such property or security can be given or even agreed to be given. The actual giving of such property or security is, therefore, not necessary.

(3) Such property or security can be given or agreed to be given either directly or indirectly.

(4) Such giving or agreeing to give can again be not only by one party to a marriage to the other but also by the parents of either party or by any other person to either party to the marriage or to any other person. It will be noticed that this clause again widens the reach of the Act insofar as those guilty of committing the offence of giving or receiving dowry is concerned.

(5) Such giving or agreeing to give can be at any time. It can be at, before, or at any time after the marriage.
Thus, it can be many years after a marriage is solemnised.

(6) Such giving or receiving must be in connection with the marriage of the parties. Obviously, the expression “in connection with” would in the context of the social evil sought to be tackled by the Dowry Prohibition Act mean “in relation with” or “relating to”.

In a three Judge Bench decision of this Court in Rajinder Singh v.State of Punjab (2015) 6 SCC 477, Section 2 of the Dowry Act has been split into six distinct parts for a better understanding of the said provision, which are as follows:

“8. A perusal of Section 2 shows that this definition can be broken into six distinct parts:

(1) Dowry must first consist of any property or valuable security— the word “any” is a word of width and would, therefore, include within it property and valuable security of any kind whatsoever.

(2) Such property or security can be given or even agreed to be given. The actual giving of such property or security is, therefore, not necessary.

(3) Such property or security can be given or agreed to be given either directly or indirectly.

(4) Such giving or agreeing to give can again be not only by one party to a marriage to the other but also by the parents of either party or by any other person to either party to the marriage or to any other person. It will be noticed that this clause again widens the reach of the Act insofar as those guilty of committing the offence of giving or receiving dowry is concerned.

(5) Such giving or agreeing to give can be at any time. It can be at, before, or at any time after the marriage. Thus, it can be many years after a marriage is solemnised.

(6) Such giving or receiving must be in connection with the marriage of the parties. Obviously, the expression “in connection with” would in the context of the social evil sought to be tackled by the Dowry Prohibition Act mean “in relation with” or “relating to”.

Interpreting soon before: In Surinder Singh judgment, while relying on the provisions of Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 & Section 304-B IPC, where the words “soon before her death” find mention, the following pertinent observations have been made: –

“17. Thus, the words “soon before” appear in Section 113-B of the Evidence Act, 1872 and also in Section 304- B IPC. For the presumptions contemplated under these sections to spring into action, it is necessary to show that the cruelty or harassment was caused soon before the death. The interpretation of the words “soon before” is, therefore, important. The question is how “soon before”? This would obviously depend on the facts and circumstances of each case……….. Therefore, “soon before” is a relative term. In matters of emotions we cannot have fixed formulae. The time-lag may differ from case to case. This must be kept in mind while examining each case of dowry death.

18. In this connection we may refer to the judgment of this Court in Kans Raj v. State of Punjab [(2000) 5 SCC 207: 2000 SCC (Cri) 935] where this Court considered the term “soon before”. The relevant observations are as under: (SCC pp. 222-23, para 15)

“15. … ‘Soon before’ is a relative term which is required to be considered under specific circumstances of each case and no straitjacket formula can be laid down by fixing any time-limit. This expression is pregnant with the idea of proximity test. The term ‘soon before’ is not synonymous with the term ‘immediately before’ and is opposite of the expression ‘soon after’ as used and understood in Section 114, Illustration (a) of the Evidence Act.

In relation to dowry deaths, the circumstances showing the existence of cruelty or harassment to the deceased are not restricted to a particular instance but normally refer to a course of conduct. Such conduct may be spread over a period of time. If the cruelty or harassment or demand for dowry is shown to have persisted, it shall be deemed to be ‘soon before death’ if any other intervening circumstance showing the nonexistence of such treatment is not brought on record, before such alleged treatment and the date of death.

Thus, there must be a nexus between the demand of dowry, cruelty or harassment, based upon such demand and the date of death. The test of proximity will have to be applied. But, it is not a rigid test. It depends on the facts and circumstances of each case and calls for a pragmatic and sensitive approach of the court within the confines of law.

The Latin maxim “Ut Res Magis Valeat Quam Pereat” i.e, a liberal construction should be put up on written instruments, so as to uphold them, if possible, and carry into effect, the intention of the parties, sums it up.

A bench comprising of Chief Justice N.V Ramana, Justice A.S Bopanna and Justice Hima Kohli ruled.

Hon’ble Mr Justice N V Ramana

Chief Justice of India, Supreme Court of India

Hon’ble Ms Justice Hima Kolhi

Judge Supreme Court of India

Hon’ble Mr. Justice Ajjikuttira Somaiah Bopanna

Judge Supreme Court of India

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