482 & The Inherent Powers of the High Court

ISSUES IN PRESENT APPEAL

The appeal in Rashmi Chopra judgment (citation of the judgment is mentioned below in the Reference section along with citations of the related matter decided by this judgment). The present appeal was filed challenging the judgment of the Allahabad High Court by which the application under Section 482 Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 was dismissed. In the application preferred in the court below, appellants filed praying for quashing of the complaint and the associated proceedings. The two issues that were examined on the scale of the law along with ambit of section 482 CRPC by the Apex court are also mentioned below:

(A) Was there any error in the summoning order issued by the magistrate in the court below?

(B)Who is competent complainant under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code?

BACKGROUND OF THE CASE

The parties to present appeal included the following:

(a) Nayan Chopra (son of Rashmi Chopra and Rajesh Chopra), resident in Hyderabad.

(b) Vanshika Bobal, (daughter of respondent No.2, Indrajeet Singh, who preferred the complaint in the court below under Section 156 (3) of the CRPC against Shri Rajesh Chopra and two unknown assailants)

(c) Amit Chopra is the brother of Nayan Chopra, resident of Hyderabad.

(d) Anita Gandhi is Mother’s Sister of Nayan Chopra,  Kuldeep Gandhi is the husband of Anita Gandhi. (residents of Greater Kailash, New Delhi, who were also dragged in the litigation)

Nayan Chopra got married with Vanshika Bobal, on 15.04.2012. Nayan Chopra with his mother, father and brother in Hyderabad. After the marriage of Nayan Chopra and Vanshika, which was performed at Noida, Vanshika went along with her husband at Hyderabad, the matrimonial home of Vanshika. On 28.04.2012, Vanshika and Nayan Chopra left for U.S.A. On or about November 2013, Vanshika and Nayan Chopra got separated from each other. In 2014, Nayan Chopra in the Circuit Court filed an application before the County of Kalamazoo Family Division, Michigan, USA, seeking divorce.

On the basis of the application of divorce by Nayan Chopra, the Family Division, Michigan gave a judgment of divorce on 24.02.2016. The order of judgment of divorce was passed after hearing both Nayan Chopra and Vanshika Bobal. The judgment of divorce made provisions for alimony, pension benefits and retirement benefits, life insurance, property settlement and provision in lieu of dower, the mutual release of claims and other provisions.

While the divorce proceedings were going on in America, a complaint was sent by father of Vanshika through registered post to the Superintendent of Police, Noida making allegations against Rajesh Chopra and two other unknown persons. Subsequently, Vanshika’s father filed an application under Section 156(3) of the CrPC. The application of the respondent the Magistrate sent No.2 to Mediation Centre running under the District Legal Services Authority for counselling.

The allegations have been made on the basis of incident dated 08.11.2014 against Rajesh Chopra and his two associates. It was alleged that Rajesh Chopra called the respondent No.2, the father of Vanshika near the Gurudwara at Sector 18, Noida to talk about the problem of Nayan Chopra and Vanshika and when respondent No.2 went for talks, he met Rajesh Chopra with two unknown persons. The Respondent No.2 further alleges that on his request to accept his daughter, against which Rajesh Chopra repeated his demand of one Crore rupees and used filthy words against Vanshika, which was objected by respondent No.2, on which Rajesh Chopra and his associates became annoyed and they abused and beat the respondent No.2 and snatched his gold chain from his neck and Rs.60,000/- from his pocket. The allegations within the meaning of Sections 323 (Punishment for Voluntarily Causing Hurt), 324 (Voluntarily causing hurt by dangerous weapon or means), 504 (Intentional insult with intent to provoke Breach of Peace),506 (Punishment for criminal intimidation), 392(Punishment for Robbery) of IPC were made on the basis of the aforesaid incident. In the application, it was also stated that Nayan Chopra has filed a petition for dissolution of marriage in America.

The application under Section 156(3) CrPC. filed by Respondent No.2 was treated as a complaint and registered, on which the learned Judicial Magistrate, Gautam Budh Nagar issued a summoning order summoning the appellants under Sections 498A, 323, 504, 506 of IPC and Section 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act as below was issued based on the complaint above.

“ORDER

The accused persons Nayan Chopra, Rajesh Chopra, Rashmi Chopra, Amit Chopra, Kuldeep Gandhi & Anita Gandhi are summoned for the offence under Sections 498A, 323, 504, 506 of IPC and Section 3/4 of D.P. Act. The complainant is directed to take steps as per Rules within one week. The case is fixed for 08.03.2017 for appearance.”

The appellants filed an application under Section 482 CrPC. in the High Court praying for quashing the complaint and proceedings and order mentioned above. In the application under Section 482 CrPC., High Court passed an order referring the matter to mediation centre of Allahabad High Court. The mediation having failed between the parties, an application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. was heard. The prayer of the appellants to quash the complaint and proceedings has been refused. The application was disposed of after directing that the applicants may surrender in the court below and make an application for bail within a period of two months. Aggrieved against the judgment of the High Court, these appeals have been filed.

THE SUBMISSIONS OF THE APPELLANT

Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the High Court failed to exercise jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. in quashing the entire complaint proceedings, which is nothing but abuse of the process of the court. It was submitted that Nayan Chopra and Vanshika Bobal were already granted a divorce by the Family Court of Michigan, a fact which was not brought to the notice of the Magistrate by respondent No.2 before summoning order was passed as per the submissions. It is submitted that a reading of the complaint does not prima facie discloses any offence under Section 498A and 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act against the appellants. The appellants, Anita Gandhi and Kuldeep Gandhi separately reside and they have never met Vanshika, the girl after marriage. The allegations in the complaint are vague, sweeping and general. The complaint is not even filed by Vanshika, the girl nor she got her statement recorded in support of the complaint. In so far as an incident alleged on 08.11.2014 at Sector 18, Noida it was submitted that no such incident took place and allegations are false and concocted to somehow rope in Rajesh Chopra, the father of the boy Nayan Chopra. The complaint has not been filed by a competent person, hence ought not to have been entertained.

COUNTER ARGUMENTS

Shri Santosh Krishnan, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.2 submits that there is no error in the summoning of the appellants by the Magistrate by order-dated 17.01.2017. It is well settled that Magistrate is not required to record elaborate reasons for the summoning of an accused. The complaint discloses several allegations pertaining to an offence under Section 498A and other offences mentioned therein. Two courts having taken one particular view of the matter, this Court may not exercise its jurisdiction in interfering with the orders. It is further submitted that Section 498A does not indicate that complaint on behalf of the women has to be filed by the women herself. The complainant was fully competent and Magistrate has committed no error in taking cognizance of the complaint.

Learned counsel for the respondent has placed reliance on Dy. Chief Controller of Imports & Exports Vs. Roshanlal Agarwal & Ors., (2003) 4 SCC 139, this Court in paragraph No. 9 of the judgment laid down following:-

“9. In determining the question whether any process is to be issued or not, what the Magistrate has to be satisfied is whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding and not whether there is sufficient ground for conviction. Whether the evidence is adequate for supporting the conviction, can be determined only at the trial and not at the stage of inquiry. At the stage of issuing the process to the accused, the Magistrate is not required to record reasons. This question was considered recently in U.P. Pollution Control Board v. Mohan Meakins Ltd., (2000) 3 SCC 745 and after noticing the law laid down in Kanti Bhadra Shah v. the State of W.B., (20000 1 SCC 14 722, it was held as follows: (SCC p. 749, para 6)

The legislature has stressed the need to record reasons in certain situations such as the dismissal of a complaint without issuing process. There is no such legal requirement imposed on a Magistrate for passing detailed order while issuing the summons. The process issued to the accused cannot be quashed merely on the ground that the Magistrate had not passed a speaking order.”

Same proposition was reiterated by this Court in Nupur Talwar Vs. Central Bureau of Investigation & Anr., (2012) 11 SCC 465. There can be no dispute to the above proposition as laid down by this Court that while taking cognizance of an offence, a Magistrate is not required to pass a detailed order, however, in a case when Magistrate issues process against a person, who is not even charged with the offence for which he is summoned, whether in such cases also the summoning order cannot be assailed?

ARRIVING AT THE RATIO

The apex court found that in this case, there are two sets of allegations, which are contained in the complaint, which has also been repeated in the statements recorded by respondent No.2 and his two witnesses – PW1 –Raj Kumar, brother of respondent No.2 and PW2 – Deepa, wife of respondent No.2. One set of allegations of an offence under Section 498A and Section 3/4 of D.P. Act and the second set of allegations are allegations made for offences under Sections 323, 504 and 506 of IPC.

(i) Allegations for offences under Sections 323, 504 and 506 of I.P.C.

The allegations under Sections 323, 504 and 506 have been made citing the incident dated 08.11.2014. The contents of the incident are already cited above and not repeated herein.

In the statement made by the complainant in support of his submission, complainant repeated the same allegations regarding incident dated 08.11.2014 as made in the complaint, as noted above. PW-2, Deepa, wife of respondent No.2 has also about the incident dated 08.11.2014 repeated the allegations as narrated in the complaint. A perusal of the allegations in the complaint makes it clear that the complaint with regard to offences under Sections 323, 504 and 506 has been made only against Rajesh Chopra and two unknown persons. Neither in the complaint nor statements made by complainant or his witnesses, there is an allegation with regard to above offences against any other appellants before us.

There are no allegations for offences under Sections 323, 504 and 506 in the complaint or statement before the Magistrate, there was no question of summoning the other appellants for offences under Sections 323, 504 and 506 of I.P.C.

When the complaint does not allege any offence against other appellants, the Apex court held that they fail to see that how the cognizance of the complaint can be taken against other appellants with regard to offences under Sections 323, 504 and 506. In the above view of the matter, the complaint as well as summoning order is liable to be quashed against all the appellants except Rajesh Chopra due to the above reasons in the above regard.

(ii) Allegations in the complaint under Section 498A and Section 3/4 of D.P. Act.

Learned counsel for the respondent in support of his submission that power of the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. has to be exercised in exceptional circumstances, has relied on the judgment of this Court in Rakhi Mishra Vs. State of Bihar and Others, (2017) 16 SCC 772. This Court in the above case has relied on an earlier judgment of this Court in Sonu Gupta Vs. Deepak Gupta, (2015) 3 SCC 424, in which judgment, in paragraph No.8 following proposition was laid down, which has been referred to and relied on:-

This Court in Rakhi Mishra’s judgment has also laid down that High Court in exceptional circumstances can exercise power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. when a prima facie case is not made out against the accused. Paragraph No.5 of the judgment is as follows:-

“5. ……..It is settled law that the power under Section 482 CrPC is exercised by the High Court only in exceptional circumstances only when a prima facie case is not made out against the accused. The test applied by this Court for interference at the initial stage of prosecution is whether the uncontroverted allegations prima facie establish a case.”

Learned counsel for the appellant has also relied on various judgments of this Court in support of his submissions. In K. Subba Rao and Others Vs. The state of Telangana, (2018) 14 SCC 452, this Court laid down following in paragraph Nos. 5 and 6:-

“5. A perusal of the charge-sheet and the supplementary charge-sheet discloses the fact that the appellants are not the immediate family members of the third respondent/husband. They are the maternal uncles of the third respondent. Except for the bald statement that they supported the third respondent who was harassing the second respondent for dowry and that they conspired with the third respondent for taking away his child to the U.S.A., nothing else indicating their involvement in the crime was mentioned. The appellants approached the High Court when the investigation was pending. The charge sheet and the supplementary charge-sheet were filed after disposal of the case by the High Court.

The apex court observed that do not normally interdict criminal proceedings at the interlocutory stage unless there is an abuse of the process of a court. This Court, at the same time, does not hesitate to interfere to secure the ends of justice.

State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Suppl. (1) SCC 335.

The courts should be careful in proceeding against the distant relatives in crimes pertaining to matrimonial disputes and dowry deaths. The relatives of the husband should not be roped in on the basis of omnibus allegations unless specific instances of their involvement in the crime are made out. Kans Raj v. the State of Punjab, (2000) 5 SCC 207 and Kailash Chandra Agrawal v. the State of U.P. (2014) 16 SCC 551”

The Apex Court in Vineet Kumar and Others Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another, (2017) 13 SCC 369 had occasion to examine the parameters of exercise of power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. in respect of quashing of the criminal proceeding. One of the judge (Justice Ashok Bhushan) speaking for the Bench after examining the scope and ambit of Section 482 Cr.P.C. laid down following in Paragraph Nos. 22 to 25:-

“22. Before we enter into the facts of the present case it is necessary to consider the ambit and scope of jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC vested in the High Court. Section 482 CrPC saves the inherent power of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code or to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.

23. This Court time and again has examined the scope of jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 CrPC and laid down several principles, which govern the exercise of jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 CrPC. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy, (1977) 2 SCC 699, held that the High Court is entitled to quash a proceeding if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process of the court or that the ends of justice require that the proceeding ought to be quashed. In para 7 of the judgment, the following has been stated: (SCC p. 703)

“7.…In the exercise of this wholesome power, the High Court is entitled to quash a proceeding if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process of the court or that the ends of justice require that the proceeding ought to be quashed. The saving of the High Court’s inherent powers, both in civil and criminal matters, is designed to achieve a salutary public purpose which is that a court proceeding ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or persecution. In a criminal case, the veiled object behind a lame prosecution, the very nature of the material on which the structure of the prosecution rests and the like would justify the High Court in quashing the proceeding in the interest of justice. The ends of justice are higher than the ends of mere law though justice has got to be administered according to laws made by the legislature. The compelling necessity for making these observations is that without a proper realisation of the object and purpose of the provision which seeks to save the inherent powers of the High Court to do justice, between the State and its subjects, it would be impossible to appreciate the width and contours of that salient jurisdiction.”

24. The judgment of this Court in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, has elaborately considered the scope and ambit of Section 482 CrPC. Although in the above case this Court was considering the power of the High Court to quash the entire criminal proceeding including the FIR, the case arose out of an FIR registered under Sections 161, 165 IPC and Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. This Court elaborately considered the scope of Section 482 CrPC/Article 226 of the Constitution in the context of quashing the proceedings in the criminal investigation. After noticing various earlier pronouncements of this Court, this Court enumerated certain categories of cases by way of illustration where power under Section 482 CrPC can be exercised to prevent abuse of the process of the Court or secure the ends of justice.

25. Para 102 which enumerates 7 categories of cases where power can be exercised under Section 482 CrPC is extracted as follows: (Bhajan Lal case, SCC pp. 378-79)

“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.

After referring to several other cases, the Apex Court concluded and made the following observations in Paragraph No. 41:-

“41. Inherent power given to the High Court under Section 482 CrPC is with the purpose and object of the advancement of justice. In case the solemn process of Court is sought to be abused by a person with some oblique motive, the Court has to thwart the attempt at the very threshold. The Court cannot permit a prosecution to go on if the case falls in one of the categories as illustratively enumerated by this Court in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal. The judicial process is a solemn proceeding which cannot be allowed to be converted into an instrument of operation or harassment. When there are materials to indicate that a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive, the High Court will not hesitate in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC to quash the proceeding under Category 7 as enumerated in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, which is to the following effect: (SCC p. 379, para 102)

“102. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.” _

Above Category 7 is clearly attracted in the facts of the present case. Although, the High Court has noted the judgment of State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, but did not advert to the relevant facts of the present case, materials on which final report was submitted by the IO. The Apex court thus is fully satisfied that the present is a fit case where the High Court ought to have exercised its jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC and quashed the criminal proceedings.”

The criminal prosecution can be allowed to proceed only when a prima facie offence is disclosed. This Court has observed that the judicial process is a solemn proceeding which cannot be allowed to be converted into an instrument of oppression or harassment. If High Court finds that proceedings deserve to be quashed in parameters as laid down by this Court in State of Haryana Vs. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, High court shall not hesitate in the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash the proceedings.

Reverting back to the allegations in the present case made in the complaint under Section 498A and Section 3/4 of D.P. Act. Few facts have to be noticed before we look into the allegations made in the complaint in the above regard. The complaint has been filed by the respondent No.2 before the C.J.M., Gautam Budh Nagar on 10.05.2015, before which date, the petition for divorce has already been filed by Nayan Chopra on 23.10.2014 before the Circuit Court for the County of Kalamazoo Family Division, Michigan. It is on the record that at the time of filing of the complaint Vanishka Bobal was living at Canada whereas Nayan Chopra was living at the U.S.A. Both were separately living. It was pleaded in the application for divorce that husband and wife had separated on or around November 2013. It is on the record that on the day criminal complaint was filed on 10.05.2015 in the Court of C.J.M. Gautam Budh Nagar by respondent No.2, neither Vanishka was in India nor she was in India at the time when statements were recorded in the complaint of the complainant as well as his two witnesses. The complaint is not by Vanishka but it has been filed by father of Vanishka, respondent No.2. In the divorce application filed in the State of Michigan, Vanishka Bobal was represented by her attorney. The divorce was granted with orders relating to alimony, pension benefits and retirement benefits, life insurance, property settlement and provision in lieu of dower, the mutual release of claims and other aspects on 24.02.2016.

There is nothing on the record to indicate that orders of divorce between the parties were brought into the notice of the Magistrate when he issued process against the appellants. We, however, are in agreement with the submission of Shri Santosh Krishan that decree of divorce between Nayan Chopra and Vanshika shall not wipe out any criminal offence, which has been committed within the meaning of I.P.C. or D.P. Act and the criminal offence committed in jurisdictional court has to be examined despite the divorce decree having been granted.

Coming back to the allegations in the complaint pertaining to Section 498A and Section 3/4 of D.P. Act. A perusal of the complaint indicates that the allegations against the appellants for an offence under Section 498A and Section 3/4 of D.P. Act are general and sweeping. No specific incident dates or details of an incident has been mentioned in the complaint. The complaint having been filed after proceeding for the divorce was initiated by Nayan Chopra in the State of Michigan, where Vanshika participated and divorce was ultimately granted. A few months after the filing of the divorce petition, the complaint has been filed in the Court of C.J.M., Gautam Budh Nagar with the allegations as noticed above. The sequence of the events and facts and circumstances of the case leads us to conclude that the complaint under Section 498A and Section 3/4 of D.P. Act have been filed as a counterblast to divorce petition proceeding in the State of Michigan by Nayan Chopra.

The Judgment of Divorce shall constitute a termination of all rights of a surviving spouse including, but not limited to, homestead allowance, election, exempt property, settlement and family allowance by each party in the property of the other, and a termination of all benefits which would otherwise pass to one party from the other by testate and intestate, succession or by virtue of any provision of any will executed prior to the entry of this Judgment of Divorce.” The above judgment in divorce proceedings indicates that Nayan Chopra and Vanshika have settled all issues between them including division of properties at the time when divorce proceedings were in progress at Michigan and both the parties were not in India, the complaint under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. had been filed making allegation under Section 498A of IPC and the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1981 only to harass and put pressure on the applicants.

One observation made by the Apex court with regard to the order passed by the High Court is as follows. The High Court in its impugned judgment has not referred to allegations made in the complaint except noticing the summoning order has been passed and noticing the principles of law. This Court had occasion to consider a similar order passed by the High Court rejecting the application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. in Jagdish Prasad and Others vs. the State of Uttar Pradesh and Another, (2019) 2 SCC 184. In the said case also under Section 482 Cr.P.C. proceedings, the challenge was made to summoning order as well as entire proceedings of complaint case where allegations under Sections 498A and 323 IPC, as well as Section 3/4 of D.P. Act, were made. In paragraph No.3, the facts giving rise to filing the application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. before the High Court has been noted. This Court made following observations in paragraph Nos.6 to 9:

“6 …. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and on perusal of the record of the case we are inclined to set aside the impugned order and remand the case to the High Court for deciding the appellants’ application, out of which this appeal arises, afresh on merits in accordance with the law.

On perusal of the impugned order, we find that the Single Judge has quoted the principles of law laid down by this Court in several decisions relating to powers of the High Court on the issue of interference in cases filed under Section 482 of the Code from para 2 to the concluding para but has not referred to the facts of the case to appreciate the controversy of the case. We are, therefore, unable to know the factual matrix of the case after reading the impugned judgment except the legal principles laid down by this Court in several decisions.

In our view, the Single Judge ought to have first set out the brief facts of the case with a view to understand the factual matrix and then examined the challenge made to the proceedings in the light of the principles of law laid down by this Court with a view to record the findings on the grounds urged by the appellants as to whether any interference therein is called for or not. We find that the aforementioned exercise was not done by the High Court while passing the impugned order.

We, therefore, find ourselves unable to concur with such disposal of the application by the High Court and feel inclined to set aside the impugned order and remand the case to the High Court (Single Judge) with a request to decide the application afresh on merits in accordance with law keeping in view the aforementioned observations. Having formed an opinion to remand the case in the light of our reasoning mentioned above, we do not consider it proper to go into the merits of the case.”

What was said by this Court in paragraph No. 7 and 8 of the above judgment is squarely applicable in the facts of the present case and the order of the High Court deserves to be set aside on this ground alone.

Issue of Competent Person to Complain under Section 498A of IPC

One of the submissions, which has been made by the learned counsel for the appellant also needs to be considered. Learned counsel for the appellant had submitted that complaint has not been filed by a competent person. It is submitted that complaint is not made by Vanshika but has been filed only by father of Vanshika, hence it is not maintainable. The above submission has been refuted by Shri Santosh Krishnan. He submits that it is not necessary that a complaint under Section 498A should be filed only by the victim of the offence. He submits that complaint filed by the father of the victim, respondent No.2 was also fully maintainable. Section 498A provides as follows:-

Section 498A provides for an offence when a husband or the relative of the husband, subject her to cruelty. There is nothing in Section 498A, which may indicate that when a woman is subjected to cruelty, a complaint has to be filed necessarily by the women so subjected. A perusal of Section 498A, as extracted above, indicates that the provision does not contemplate that complaint about the offence under Section 498A should be filed only by women, who are subjected to cruelty by husband or his relative. We, thus, are of the view that complaint filed by respondent No.2, the father of Vanshika cannot be said to be not maintainable on this ground. We, thus, reject the submission of the counsel for the appellant that the complaint filed by respondent No.2 was not maintainable.

In view of the foregoing discussions, insofar as the offence under Section 498A and Section 3/4 of D.P. Act is concerned, the apex court was of the view that present is a case, which is covered by Category 7 as enumerated by State of Haryana Vs. Bhajan Lal (supra) and the High Court erred in refusing to exercise under Section 482 Cr.P.C. The court observed that in so far as allegations against Rajesh Chopra pertaining to Sections 323, 504 and 506 of IPC is concerned, there were specific allegations, which were also supported by the complainant and his two witnesses in the evidence, at this stage, this Court cannot pronounce as to whether any incident as alleged by the complainant happened on 08.11.2014 or alleged as offence by respondent No.2 or offence as alleged was committed by Rajesh Chopra or not.

The Apex court held that in view of above- “We, thus, are of the view that insofar as complaint pertaining to offence under Sections 323, 504 and 506 I.P.C. against Rajesh Chopra is concerned, said complaint shall be proceeded with and the order dated 17.01.2017 is upheld to the above extent only, i.e., summoning of Rajesh Chopra under Sections 323, 504 and 506.”

REFERENCES

The judgment arising out of appeal in Rashmi Chopra case and a bunch of other appeals [Rashmi Chopra vs. the State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. Criminal appeal no.594 of 2019 (arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.8103/2018); with Criminal appeal no.598 of 2019 (arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.8050/2018) Anita Gandhi versus the State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. with criminal appeal no.599 of 2019 (arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.8052/2018) Nayan Chopra through POA holder Rajesh Chopra versus the state of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. with criminal appeal nO.597 of 2019 (arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.8042/2018) Amit Chopra versus the State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. with criminal appeal no.596 of 2019 (arising out of SLP (Crl.) no.8041/2018) Kuldeep Gandhi versus the State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. and (arising out of SLP (Crl.) no.8039/2018) Rajesh Chopra versus the State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr.]